The normal sanction for violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights is to preclude the evidence obtained as the result of the violation from being used against the defendant in a criminal trail.

It is worthy of note that the scope of the exclusionary rule is different for each constitutional violation.

The 4^th Amendment Exclusionary rule can be traced back to the 1914 SC decision in Weeks v. United States.

IN Weeks, the court held that evidence obtained by federal agents in violation of the 4^th would be inadmissible in federal court.

In Wolf (1949) the court refused to apply the 4^th Amendment exclusionary rule to the states.

The court noted that 30 states had rejected the rule in their own superior courts.

In 1961, the court reversed the Wolf decision in Mapp.

After Mapp, evidence illegally obtained from illegal searches and seizures would not be admissible in criminal trails against the person whose rights had been violated—in both state and federal courts.

In order to object to the admission of evidence obtained as the result of an illegal search, the person must have standing to object.

The doctrine of legal standing is a judicially created doctrine.

There are two parts to the concept of standing.

First, the person asserting the claim must have suffered an actual injury or invasion of a constitutional right.

Second, the right asserted must be abased on that person’s legal right.

You cannot assert the rights of a third person.

The SC has ruled that a person must have standing to assert the exclusionary rule.

The defendant had someone else drive his car across country to his home.

While en route, the car was stopped by the police.

The driver consented to a search, and illegal drugs were found.

The court of appeals held that the owner of the car did not have standing to object even though he owned the car.

The court stated that legal standing is generally limited to those who are actually stopped with the car, since it was they were inconvenienced.

IN cases involving overnight guests, the issue of standing generally depends on whether the guests have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the third person’s home.

The "good faith" exception is a misnomer.

The be a good faith exception implies that as long as the officer acts in good faith—a subjective test—then the evidence should be admissible.

The test, however, is an objective one, and would be better called the "reasonable good-faith test."

The exception is based on the concept that if the police were acting with reasonable belief in good faith that their actions were legal, then the evidence should not be excluded for constitutional violations.

SC held that the 4^th exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar its use in the prosecutions case-in-chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a defective search warrant that was issued by a neutral and detached magistrate.

The court noted that the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the error of judges.

The purged taint exception is based on the concept that the connection has been broken between the unlawful police conduct and the tainted evidence.

The defendant was illegally arrested.

The police obtained a statement from him in his bedroom within minutes of the illegal arrest.

He was then released from custody.

While awaiting trial, he returned voluntarily to the police station and made incriminating statements.

SC: The statements made after he was released were admissible and that the intervening facts of his release from custody and his v9oluntary return to talk to the police had purged the taint of his initial illegal arrest.

The police arrested Brown without PC to question him regarding a murder.

He was taken to the police station and advised of his Miranda rights.

He made an initial incriminating statement within two hours of his arrests, and after being readvised of his Miranda rights, made a second incriminating statement.

The prosecution argued that by advising the defendant of his Miranda rights, the connection between the illegal arrest and the statement shad been broken and thus the taint had been purged.

The SC held that both statement were inadmissible because the arrests was illegal.

The courts stated that the question in the case was "whether, granting the establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."

The independent source exception is based on the concept that even if the police obtained the evidence by a constitutional violation they could or would have obtained the information from a source that was not connected to the illegal action.

This exception proceeds from the premise that the source producing the evidence stands apart form the influence of the constitutional violation with no links between the two.

The police made an illegal entry into a warehouse.

Later the police obtained a warrant and made a legal entry.

The court held that if the police decision t5o seek a warrant had not been prompted by what was learned during the earlier unlawful entry, the evidence was admissible.

The police entered an apartment without a warrant and arrested the occupants.

The police then remained illegally on the scene for several hours while others obtained a warrant.

The police could have left the apartment and secured the premises by "stakeout."

SC: the police did in fact obtain a valid search warrant and their remaining on the premises had no bearing on the seizure of the evidence; the evidence was admissible under the independent source exception.

In Nix v. Williams, the SC held that even though the evidence was obtained by violation of William’s Miranda rights, it was admissible because the police would have inevitably discovered the evidence is question.

The court, in admitting the evidence, ruled that for the inevitable discovery exception to apply, the prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered.

In Williams, the interrogation disclosed the location of the victim's body.

At the time of the interrogation, the police and about 200 volunteers were conducting a grid-type search for the body in the area where the body was found.

Accordingly, the evidence on the body that linked the killing to Williams as admitted.

The court has been more reluctant to apply the exclusionary rule to Miranda violations involving confessions or admissions.

Generally, the court tries to determine if there is only a Miranda violation or if there is also a violation of due process.

A violation of due process includes situations where the confession or admission is not a product of the defendant’s free and rational choice.

The right to counsel under the 6^th Amendment is only violated if the government "deliberately elicits" information from the accused.

To exclude evidence obtained as the result of a Sixth Amendment violation, the defendant must have legal standing, that is, a violation of his constitutional rights.

There does not appear to be a good faith exception to Six Amendment violations.

Moulton was under indictment for one crime. The government deliberately elicited information from him regarding another crime for which he had not been indicted.

During the conversation, Moulton made statements regarding the crime for which he was under indictment.

The court held that despite the governments good intentions, the statement was inadmissible.

The exclusionary rule does not apply to noncriminal trial proceedings such as:

Grand juries

Civil tax proceedings

Deportation hearings

Is there a fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine for Miranda violations?

Two SC cases, Michigan v. Tucker and Oregon v. Elstad imply that there is not.

In tucker the prosecution was not allowed to directly use statements given in violation of Miranda, but indirect information was allowed (the names of witnesses).