IEJS > Law > Procedure > Fourth Amendment Exceptions

Leading Cases on Fourth Amendment Exceptions

  • MINNESOTA v. DICKERSON, 508 U.S. 366 (1993)
    Discusses when a seizure is permissible without a warrant under the plain view doctrine.
     

  • ARIZONA v. HICKS, 480 U.S. 321 (1987)
    Under the plain view doctrine, the incriminating character of the evidence must be immediately apparent.
     
  • UNITED STATES v. DUNN, 480 U.S. 294 (1987)
    The use of drug dogs to detect narcotics in luggage is not a search because it exposes only contraband.
     
  • OLIVER v. UNITED STATES, 466 U.S. 170 (1984)
    Discusses the open fields exception to the Fourth Amendment search warrant requirement.
     
  • UNITED STATES v. MARTINEZ-FUERTE, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)
    "The Border Patrol's routine stopping of a vehicle at a permanent checkpoint located on a major highway away from the Mexican border for brief questioning of the vehicle's occupants is consistent with the Fourth Amendment."
     
  • ALMEIDA-SANCHEZ v. UNITED STATES, 413 U.S. 266 (1973)
    Searches without  reasonable suspicion at checkpoints located away from the border are not permissible.
     
  • UNITED STATES v. BRIGNONI-PONCE, 422 U.S. 873 (1975)
    "The Fourth Amendment held not to allow a roving patrol of the Border Patrol to stop a vehicle near the Mexican border and question its occupants about their citizenship and immigration status, when the only ground for suspicion is that the occupants appear to be of Mexican ancestry."
     
  •  COLONNADE CORP. v. UNITED STATES, 397 U.S. 72 (1970)
    The court held that health and other administrative exceptions, although different than searches for criminal evidence, still had to comply with the Fourth Amendment.
     
  • NEW JERSEY v. T. L. O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)
    "The Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by public school officials and is not limited to searches carried out by law enforcement officers."
     
  • VERNONIA SCHOOL DIST. 47J v. ACTON, ___ U.S. ___ (1995)
    The Petitioner school district's Student Athlete Drug Policy, which authorizes random urinalysis drug testing of students who participate in its athletics programs, was held to be consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
     
  • SKINNER v. RAILWAY LABOR EXECUTIVES' ASSN., 489 U.S. 602 (1989)
    Mandating submission of biological samples to be tested for drugs without suspicion or warrant was upheld when the company requiring the samples was already heavily regulated by the government.
     
  • HUDSON v. PALMER, 468 U.S. 517 (1984)
    "A prisoner has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his prison cell entitling him to the protection of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches."
     
  • UNITED STATES v. BISWELL, 406 U.S. 311 (1972)
    Airport searches by metal detectors and x-ray devices were upheld.
     
  •  SCHNECKLOTH v. BUSTAMONTE, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)
    "When the subject of a search is not is custody and the State would justify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntary; voluntariness is to be determined from the totality of the surrounding circumstances. While knowledge of a right to refuse consent is a factor to be taken into account, the State need not prove that the one giving permission to search knew that he had a right to withhold his consent."
     
  • LEWIS v. UNITED STATES, 385 U.S. 206 (1966)
    The Court Rejected petitioner's motion to suppress the purchased narcotics by an undercover agent  as illegally seized without warrant.
     
  • BUMPER v. NORTH CAROLINA, 391 U.S. 543 (1968)
    "A search cannot be justified as lawful on the basis of consent when that "consent" has been given only after the official conducting the search has asserted that he possesses a warrant; there is no consent under such circumstances."
     
  • UNITED STATES v. MATLOCK, 415 U.S. 164 (1974)
    "When the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by proof of voluntary consent it is not limited to proof that consent was given by the defendant, but may show that permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected."
     
  • ILLINOIS v. RODRIGUEZ, 497 U.S. 177 (1990)
    "A warrantless entry is valid when based upon the consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of the entry, reasonably believe to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does not."
     
  • UNITED STATES v. KARO, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)
    "The monitoring of a beeper in a private residence, a location not opened to visual surveillance, violates the Fourth Amendment rights of those who have a justifiable interest in the privacy of the residence."
     
  • FLORIDA v. RILEY, 488 U.S. 445 (1989)
    A law enforcement officer did not need a warrant to circled twice over defendant's property in a helicopter at the height of 400 feet and make naked-eye observations through openings in the greenhouse roof and its open sides and determine there were marijuana plants inside.
     
  • RAKAS v. ILLINOIS, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)
    "...a person aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed."
     
  • RAWLINGS v. KENTUCKY, 448 U.S. 98 (1980)
    Rawlings did not have standing to object to the search of a friend's purse in which he had placed drugs belonging to him.
     
  • SCHMERBER v. CALIFORNIA, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)
    The court upheld the taking of a blood sample from a person without a warrant under acceptable medical standards because there were exigent circumstances: if law enforcement waited for a warrant, alcohol in the suspect's blood would dissipate. 
     
  • WINSTON v. LEE, 470 U.S. 753 (1985)
    "A compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body for evidence implicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be "unreasonable" even if likely to produce evidence of a crime."
     
  • MINNESOTA v. OLSON, 495 U.S. 91 (1990)
    "Olson's status as an overnight guest is alone sufficient to show that he had an expectation of privacy in the home that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."
     
  • HENRY v. UNITED STATES, 361 U.S. 98 (1959)
    The relaxation of the search warrant requirement in cases of automobile searches did not relax the probable cause requirement.
     
  • CARROLL v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132 (1925)
    Held that a warrantless search of a vehicle is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
     
  •  CALIFORNIA v. CARNEY, 471 U.S. 386 (1985)
    The warrantless search of respondent's motor home did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
     
  • PENNSYLVANIA v. MIMMS, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)
    "The order to get out of the car, issued after the respondent was lawfully detained, was reasonable and thus permissible under the Fourth Amendment. The State's proffered justification for such order - the officer's safety - is both legitimate and weighty, and the intrusion into respondent's personal liberty occasioned by the order, being at most a mere inconvenience, cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate concerns for the officer's safety."
     
  • MICHIGAN DEPT. OF STATE POLICE v. SITZ, 496 U.S. 444 (1990)
    The police may briefly detain all cars on a public road to check for intoxication.
     
  • CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS et al. v. EDMOND et al.  (2000)
    Because a narcotics checkpoint program's primary purpose is indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control, the checkpoints violate the Fourth Amendment. [Unlike Sitz, where there was a public safety concern].
         
  • CHIMEL v. CALIFORNIA, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)
    "An arresting officer may search the arrestee's person to discover and remove weapons and to seize evidence to prevent its concealment or destruction, and may search the area "within the immediate control" of the person arrested, meaning the area from which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence."
     
  • NEW YORK v. BELTON, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)
    "Not only may the police search the passenger compartment of the car in such circumstances, they may also examine the contents of any containers found in the passenger compartment. And such a container may be searched whether it is open or closed, since the justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no privacy interest in the container but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have."
     
  • TERRY v. OHIO, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
    "Where a reasonably prudent officer is warranted in the circumstances of a given case in believing that his safety or that of others is endangered, he may make a reasonable search for weapons of the person believed by him to be armed and dangerous  regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest that individual for crime or the absolute certainty that the individual is armed."
     
  • UNITED STATES v. SHARPE, 470 U.S. 675 (1985)
    "In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, it is appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant."
     
  • MARYLAND v. BUIE, 494 U.S. 325 (1990)
    "Here, the police had an analogous interest in taking steps to assure themselves that Buie's house was not harboring other persons who were dangerous and who could unexpectedly launch an attack, and the fact that Buie had an expectation of privacy in rooms that were not examined by the police prior to the arrest does not mean that such rooms were immune from entry. No warrant was required, and as an incident to the arrest the officers could, as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be launched."

 


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